## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON

OHIO VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION, INC., WEST VIRGINIA HIGHLANDS CONSERVANCY, INC., and SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-5006

FOLA COAL COMPANY, LLC,

Huntington, West Virginia

Defendant. August 4, 2014

TRANSCRIPT OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. CHAMBERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**APPEARANCES:** 

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## Monday, August 4, 2014, at 10:30 a.m. in open court

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THE COURT: All right. We've got this matter scheduled today for a pretrial.

As I understand it, there are two pending motions. I went over the integrated pretrial order. It appears that other than these two motions, there's really nothing that the Court need do before we can start the trial; is that right?

MR. HARVEY: I think that's right. I'm not sure --I want to make sure I understand which two motions you're referring to. I assume it's the motion to exclude Carrie Kuehn, the epidemiologist, and then perhaps our motion to strike. Is that --

THE COURT: Yes, that's the only two I'm aware of.

MR. HARVEY: Okay. With respect to the second motion, Mr. Becher approached me this morning. We were talking. We may be able to resolve that without having the Court hear that issue today if that's okay.

THE COURT: Probably. But how are you trying to resolve it?

MR. BECHER: We would propose a compromise, Your Honor. There were two studies. Just the supplemental expert reports, there are two studies that came out after the reports and after depositions. We had submitted supplemental expert reports that deal with those studies.

Our view is that they're both in line with the original

so make sure that you speak slowly and loudly so that my court 1 reporter can hear you. 2 3 All right. Then with regard to --THE CLERK: Now it's on. 4 5 THE COURT: It just came on. With regard, then, to the plaintiffs' motion, I've read 6 7 everything, read the deposition, read the report. 8 Is there any further argument that the parties want to 9 offer or summarize? 10 MR. BECHER: Briefly, Your Honor, if I may. 11 THE COURT: Go ahead. 12 MR. BECHER: Under Rule 702 an expert must be 13 qualified by knowledge, experience, skill, or training; and it 14 must apply that knowledge, skill, experience, or training to 15 the facts and methodologies of the case. 16 We have a couple of problems with Miss Kuehn's testimony. 17 First, she clearly points and testifies to matters outside of 18 her knowledge and skill base. She makes statements such as 19 her review of the DEP data confirm that temperatures strongly 20 associated with the viability of sensitive invertebrate, and 21 there's an abundance of information and other factors that may 22 explain the relationship between conductivity and the WVSCI 23 score. 24 Miss Kuehn is not an ecologist and she freely admits

that. These statements are clearly within the field of

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ecology and not within her relevant expertise of epidemiology or statistics. In fact, when she was asked to support these statements, she simply pointed to graphs which she had copied verbatim from Dr. Menzie, defendant's other proffered expert witness's expert report.

She admitted in deposition she had done no analysis of that data herself, and in fact deferred all questions about those analyses to Dr. Menzie. Because of this, she not only testifies to matters on ecology, but the limited relevant experience she may have to analyze data was not applied to generate these graphs and these exhibits, and we feel that those should clearly be excluded.

Because she did not analyze the facts and data that were directly relevant to this case, Miss Kuehn goes to general challenges of the causal method used by EPA in developing the benchmark. We point out this is the very causal mechanism that the defendant's other expert, Dr. Menzie, in a similar case referred to as basically the gold standard and criticized plaintiffs' experts for not following.

I want to make two points. The first is argued by plaintiffs in that same case. While we do believe this is a good method, we do not believe it's the only method. We believe that it allows for flexibility, and the science itself is flexible. It does not need some sort of rigid analysis to progress and determine things like causation of two factors.

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What Miss Kuehn tried to do is point out that this method is different from her own field of epidemiology. Plaintiffs recognize that there are principles of epidemiology that have been adopted to form this causal mechanism used by EPA. However, it has been adapted. It has not been taken verbatim. And those adaptations are critical. And that's what Miss Kuehn cannot testify about.

She can explain to us why -- or, excuse me -- how this is different from epidemiological methods, but she has no insight or background in ecology to explain why those differences may matter or why they may or may not be appropriate.

This gap in her knowledge became evident during deposition when she admitted she could not do a causal analysis of the relevant factors herself, that she would need to rely on an ecological expert such as Dr. Menzie or plaintiffs' experts.

She struggled to give examples of what she would have done differently with the data that was available, and when pressed, only -- could only answer that there was not lab data to confirm this relationship. And I think this fixation with lab data, as we pointed out in our brief, shows the key difference in Miss Kuehn's field and the relevant field here.

In a field like ecology, studying complicated systems, it's not always possible to replicate the environmental conditions in a lab. Because of that, the field of ecology has principles and methods that are adapted to account for that limitation. That does not mean the science is wrong. That does not mean the lab data cannot be incorporated or it's helpful when it is available, but there are many situations when it is not available, and that does not discount the science and the findings of that science. And that's something that Miss Kuehn just simply does not seem to grasp.

I'll leave it at that. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Harvey?

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MR. HARVEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the Clean Water Act is over 40 years old; and in its entire history, EPA has always used laboratory data to set water quality standards. Essentially it takes test organisms and exposes them to pollutants in a lab, studies the reaction, and it sets a standard.

The conductivity benchmark was different. For the first time ever, the EPA based conclusions on observational data, not data generated in a laboratory. They took data gathered by agencies like the DEP, as the Court is well aware, ran correlation analyses on that data, looked at confounding factors, and reached conclusions regarding causation.

To do this, which was a first for the agency, it relied upon principles of epidemiology, and it was very explicit in doing so. If you read our response, you will see throughout

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the benchmark and the supporting papers, they say on multiple occasions we're using principles of epidemiology. We're using epidemiological methods. We are borrowing from human health epidemiology. And that was appropriate, because that is what epidemiologists do. They take observational data and they address issues of general causation.

The link between smoking and lung cancer was established by epidemiologists studying observational data. It's a well-accepted science, and EPA was right to rely upon it. It's also a very rigorous science. It took decades to establish the link between smoking and lung cancer.

EPA -- I mean, epidemiologists not only had to show that there was a correlation between the two, they spent decades determining whether or not there were confounding factors like alcohol use or urbanization that had been taken into account.

The process is very rigorous. The courts have accepted it; and if it's done right, it can give you a correct conclusion. If it's done incorrectly, it can give you a spurious conclusion. And there are many examples of those over the last 50 years.

So we asked a trained epidemiologist to look at what EPA had done, to see if they had properly borrowed from epidemiology and used proper epidemiological methods. She found that their work and the work of Dr. King was severely lacking in that regard. The way they treated confounding

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factors was inappropriate and not the way an epidemiologist would conduct the analysis.

Plaintiffs have shown us nothing to suggest that for ecology the rules are different, that somehow you can use a half-baked analysis for ecology. The rules are the same. can reach statistically inappropriate conclusions if you apply the wrong methodology to ecological data.

The plaintiffs do not want the Court to hear this testimony. Their expert is not a trained epidemiologist. Не is not a trained statistician. Dr. King is an ecologist. Не will tell you that the benchmark was rigorous and peer-reviewed, but he does not have the background to spot errors in the benchmark or in his own analysis in our view.

We think the testimony from Miss Kuehn, a trained epidemiologist, will inform the Court as to whether errors were made. In fact, we think it would be wrong for the Court to reach conclusions about causation if there are still open questions about issues like confounding.

The plaintiffs, to avoid the testimony of Miss Kuehn, have thrown the Court a curve ball. They have suggested that she should not be allowed to testify because she is not an ecologist, to which we respond, so what?

The epidemiologists who established the link between smoking and lung cancer were not oncologists. They were not medical doctors. Sir Bradford Hill, the most famous and the

lead epidemiologist, was a statistician. That is what epidemiologists do. They look at observational data. They run statistical analyses to see if you can infer causation from that data. They do not have to be experts in the underlying field. Normally, they are not. They're not medical doctors. They're trained in the field of epidemiology and statistics. That is what Miss Kuehn is.

We think her testimony is highly relevant and very reliable and appropriate under the Rules of -- under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence.

The plaintiffs say that she was fixated on laboratory data. She does not believe that he can establish causation without it. I don't know if you read the entire deposition, but I sat there and what I saw was simply a difference in semantics or terminology.

Here is the Federal Reference Manual on Epidemiology. It says as follows: Epidemiology -- and this is on page 598, Third Edition.

Epidemiology cannot prove causation. Rather causation is a judgment for epidemiologists and others interpreting the epidemiological data.

I think all Miss Kuehn was saying is that philosophically you cannot use epidemiology to prove anything. You can infer it from all the lines of evidence, but you cannot prove it.

If you want to prove it, you need laboratory data. But I did

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criticism.

not take her to say that ecology was some inferior science or epidemiology was superior in some way. She simply said, look, EPA borrowed principles of epidemiology in establishing the benchmark. They did it incorrectly. THE COURT: All right. MR. HARVEY: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Becher, do you want a brief reply? MR. BECHER: Briefly, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. BECHER: Just a couple of points. First, it may be a fairly minor point in the motion, but I do want to address the criticism of Dr. King as not being expert in statistics. In deposition and also in front of this Court back in December, Dr. King was very careful to say that he was an expert in ecological data analysis because he thought statistics was too broad a field for anyone to be expert in. In fact, Dr. King had, beyond taking several statistics courses in undergrad and grad school, teaches statistic courses and even designed a well-accepted and well-used statistical method in the field of ecology. I just want to make sure -- I know we'll get to

qualification later, but I did want to respond to that

what is important here is to recognize that the benchmark,

Also, when it comes to the data in the benchmark, I think

while it borrowed from epidemiological principles, adapted those methods to the relevant field of ecology. It was created by EPA, reviewed by several of the EPA scientists before being submitted to a Scientific Advisory Board for EPA and being promulgated that way.

Since then, these methods have been reviewed by peer reviewers in independent published articles. And if Miss Kuehn wants to, you know, criticize the entire field for those oversights that she finds from, you know, misapplying epidemiological principles, I mean that is one thing, but to be able to criticize the adaptation of that to the relevant field is something we do not believe she should be able to do.

I also do want to briefly address the issue of smoking and lung cancer. It did, of course, take, you know, decades to improve -- or, excuse me -- to prove the association between smoking and lung cancer.

During those decades, many, many people died, but I think there was rigorous science and evidence supporting that link well before that could have prevented that. And I would submit that it was obfuscation that caused the link to take so long to be made. And that's something we definitely want to avoid in matters of science going forward, especially when there are significant problems that result.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Well, as I've indicated, I've read through everything,

including the deposition and the report, and I appreciate the arguments made here today.

I'm going to deny the motion. I think that Miss Kuehn is permitted -- should be permitted to testify as an epidemiologist. It's clear that the benchmark developed by EPA relies in part upon epidemiological methods, and I think that it's fair for the defense to criticize those methods. It may well be that the rebuttal to that criticism is that you can't apply those principles the same way Miss Kuehn would in the field of ecology, but I think that's for the experts to argue about and for the Court to hear testimony about.

I would not want to preclude that debate. So I'm going to deny the motion, and she'll be permitted to testify.

You've indicated that you might have some stipulation that would reduce by one the number of witnesses. If that's not the case, how long is it going to take to have the plaintiff put on its case?

MR. BECHER: We were discussing this among counsel this morning, Your Honor, and had basically come to the agreement somewhere between three and four days. Hopefully with this stipulation, we can keep it at three.

THE COURT: Are you saying three days to four days to put your case on?

MR. BECHER: No, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Total?

1 MR. BECHER: -- total. 2 THE COURT: All right. At this point, then, how 3 many witnesses do you expect to have, assuming no stipulations to reduce the number? 4 5 MR. BECHER: Assuming no stipulation, we would have three witnesses on direct, and then two of those would also be 6 7 rebuttal witnesses, and then one additional rebuttal witness. 8 So four witnesses total. 9 THE COURT: And then what about the defense? 10 MR. HARVEY: Two witnesses. 11 THE COURT: The two experts? 12 MR. HARVEY: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Well, one of the reasons I'm 14 asking is I've got another case that is also scheduled for 15 trial that week. The parties are coming in here about 11:30 for the pretrial conference in that. I'm not sure yet how I'm 16 17 going to adjust or deal with this. It may be that it affects 18 how quickly we can start this trial or not. 19 I think that the other case, it will be a jury trial, and 20 it will be relatively brief, certainly no more than two days, 21 but I'm not sure yet. 22 So I just bring that to your attention. If it looks like 23 the trial date -- commencement date is going to be affected by 24 this other matter, then I'll just have to let you know as soon 25 as I can. I know you've got experts scheduled to be in that

week, so I'll certainly try to avoid affecting this trial date.

You mentioned at the beginning that there might be some agreement that would moot the defendant's motion with respect to the supplemental reports.

Is there any chance that as a result of those supplemental reports and the defendant's objection that you all will want to postpone the trial some short time while these new reports are analyzed and the defendant can rebut?

MR. BECHER: Your Honor, with respect to that and with respect to any delay of the trial generally, I think plaintiffs would ask that we try to make all efforts to have the trial happen at all time -- on time. Of course, I realize the Court has a congested docket, but we do have multiple experts coming in from various parts of the country, and they are by and large academics who are much more free during the summer than later on during the academic year.

THE COURT: Well, all right.

MR. HARVEY: Not much to add, Your Honor. If we can work out that issue, my sense is there would be no reason to move the trial date. If we can't --

THE COURT: All right. So I expect you to report back let's say by the end of business tomorrow or sooner obviously if you've resolved the second -- the defendant's motion. And if you haven't, then my guess is that I'm going

to convene some type of a hearing later this week, perhaps by telephone to accommodate everybody's schedules, but we'll take that up and I'll have a much better idea also about whether this other case is even going to go to trial or not.

All right. Is there anything else that we need to address?

MR. HARVEY: One short question, Your Honor, that may make it easier on us later. The exhibits in this case are cumbersome. The last trial we put them in a notebook. My preference would be, where we can, to put those exhibits on the screen for the Court's review. And if the Court or the parties want to refer to the notebook, they can, but not to break the flow if we can avoid it by using electronic means.

THE COURT: That's fine, and it probably would work better. It's awful hard for us to appear -- and I know it is for you as well -- to have all these notebooks and have to go searching through the things in the notebook by exhibit number.

So I'm certainly amenable to doing it some different way. It was really difficult for me to follow, but it would also seem to me that -- I realize when you prepare these notebooks in advance, you really can't be sure at what point in the testimony they're going to be addressed, and so they're not necessarily in any sort of chronological, in the terms of the presentation, any chronological order. It may be better if --

MR. HARVEY: We're learning from the last trial.

We'll try to do better in that regard, and my promise to the

Court and Mr. Becher is if we are moving too fast and someone

actually wants to see the paper copy of the exhibit in the

notebook, we can always slow down.

THE COURT: Well, and to be honest with you, while I certainly also like to use the monitors and rely upon them, I really like to have the documents up here too. So I'm going to want to have copies of all these.

MR. HARVEY: We'll try to do the best we can with the pace.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else we need to address, then?

MR. BECHER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You'll need to speak with Terry at least the week before the trial to talk about using the electronic system. I know you've all used it, but we make everybody go through it again before the trial just to make sure that we don't run into any glitches. And since we aren't trying many cases, we're not using this system regularly, and so sometimes, you know, we haven't used it for a few months and we've got a trial and we find out something is wrong and --

MR. HARVEY: Terry has been extremely helpful, and we wouldn't think of showing up here without having a trial run.

THE COURT: All right. All right. If there's nothing further, then, we'll stand in recess and expect to hear back from you by tomorrow afternoon sometime. (Hearing concluded at 10:59 a.m.) I, Teresa M. Ruffner, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/Teresa M. Ruffner May 15, 2015